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NOTE
CIVIL FORFEITURE AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE:
DOES BAJA KAJIAN PROVIDE FALSE HOPE FOR DRUGRELATED OFFENDERS?
Chet Little* *"
"We are troubled by the government's view that any property, whether
it be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building can be seized by the
government because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal
record, engages in a single drug transaction."'
United States v. 508 Depot Street.
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1. 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted), rev 'd sub nom. United States v.
Austin, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Civil forfeiture 2 is one of the most highly debated topics in American
jurisprudence today. The reason for the debate is centered on the scope of3
its application and the limited protection afforded to those affected by it.
Under current federal procedure, a person's assets are subject to forfeiture
if the government can show probable cause that the property was involved
in the related offense.4 Once probable cause has been shown, the burden
shifts to the owner, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that his property is not subject to forfeiture.5 If the owner fails to meet the
burden, the government becomes the rightful owner of the property
regardless of whether the original owner is found guilty of the crime
charged.6
Today, civil forfeiture is most often used to seize assets in drug-related
crimes.7 Adopted by the government as a deterrent to drug trafficking, civil
forfeiture was intended as "the ideal weapon for breaking the backs of
sophisticated narcotics operations." ' Not only is civil forfeiture designed
to take the profit out of drug-related crime, but it also provides law
enforcement agencies with the opportunity to use the proceeds for their
own benefit in the fight against narcotics. 9
While government agencies fill their coffers with proceeds from drugrelated seizures, instances of forfeiture abuse become more routine across

2. Civil forfeiture, as referred to in this note, is the codification of the common law civil
forfeiture into 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 881 authorizes, among others, the
forfeiture of all illegal controlled substances; property used as a container for the controlled
substances; conveyances used to traffic the narcotics; assets furnished by or used in the drug trade;
and all real property involved in drug related violations. See id.
3. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas warned of the potential for abuse in civil forfeitures, stating that "fi]mproperly used,
forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but
hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who
associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice system." Id. at 456.
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
5. See Rick Fueyo, Note, Normative Considerationsof Asset Forfeiture Under the Drug
Abuse ControlAct-Who Will Protectthe People?-The Judiciaryas Vox Populi,7 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 143, 150-51 (1994).
6. See Charmin Bortz Shiely, Note, United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standardfor
Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to CriminalForfeituresAffect Civil ForfeitureAnalysis?, 77
N.C.L. REV. 1595, 1596 n.3 (1999).
7. See Scott Hiaasen, Forfeiture Law Funds Police Targeting Drug Dealers,COX NEWS
SERV., Oct. 1, 1999 at 3.
8. S.REP. No. 225,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3374.
9. See M. Lynette Eaddy, Note, How -Much Is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the
Excessive Fines Clause After Austin v. United States, 45 FLA. L. REV. 709, 711 (1993).
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the country.'0 Although civil forfeiture was meant to paralyze sophisticated
narcotics operations, small-time dealers often feel its sting." For example,
in New York, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the forfeiture of
a $140,000 apartment that was used to consummate the sale of $250 worth
of cocaine. 2 Although the federal guidelines for the crime recommended
the maximum sentence of $30,000, the court stated: "We recognize that
these are merely possible sentences and are not conclusive as to what a
court might do in an individual case. The fine in this case, while large, is not
a grossly disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence." 3
In North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
seizure of a woman's farm after she pled guilty to selling 2.9 grams of
cocaine on her property. 4 Although the court acknowledged that she was
only a middleman in the transaction and received a minimal profit from the
deal, the claim by the government was allowed. 5 As a result
of the Fourth
6
Circuit's decision, the woman was rendered homeless.'
This note will address the disproportionate impact civil forfeiture has on
minor drug offenses as well as the defenses available under the Supreme
Court's current interpretation ofthe Excessive Fines Clause. First, this note
examines the incorporation and evolution of civil forfeiture. in America's
10. See Marvin Zalman, Another View: Marvin Zalman: InsidiousSide of DrugForfeiture
Laws, THE DETROIT NEWS, May 9, 1997 at A 1l. Marvin Zalman, a professor of criminal justice
at Wayne State University in Detroit, wrote:
This is not news. Since 1991, newspapers have uncovered a host of abuses.
Grandparents lost a house because their grandson had a marijuana joint. The
owner of a $5-million California estate was shot dead at 8 in the morning during
a raid based on a misguided hunch that he was growing drugs. A cosmetics
salesman with a gambling hobby lost $9,000 of purely legal cash in the Miami
airport on the way to Vegas. Federal agents seized his cash on the "probable
cause" that anyone carrying cash from Miami to Las Vegas was a drug dealer.
The gambler gave up his money when he discovered that he had to sue the
government to get his money back and the costs came to more than $9,000. A
New York prosecutor drove a confiscated BMW.
Id.
11. See Fueyo, supra note 5, at 144. In 1994, Fueyo noted that "[t]he wide net that Congress
created to ensnare the kingpins of illegal narcotics has also snared unintended targets, and law
enforcement has not always thrown back the extra catch." Id.; see also Hiassen, supra note 7, at
2 (quoting Stephen Melnick, an attorney who once prosecuted forfeiture cases for the Boca Raton,
Florida Police Department) ("[t]he statute had some good intentions to punish the big-time
trafficker... [blut the only one getting punished is the small-time user").
12. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1992).
13. Id. at 39.
14. See United States v. Santoro, 866 F. 2d 1538, 1540-41 (4th Cir. 1989).
15. See id. at 1541.
16. See id.
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'War on Drugs.' The note then explains the Supreme Court's decision in
7 and its impact on the excessive fines defense.
United States v. Bajakajian"
The third section of the note discusses the recent interpretations of
Bajakajianin minor narcotics cases. In the forth section, the note analyzes
the reasons why the excessive fines defense has failed in current cases,
despite the ruling in Bajakajian. Finally, the note considers possible
solutions to the current application of civil forfeiture.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE IN DRUG-RELATED CASES

A. The Creation of Section 881
Reasons for the. debate over the use of civil forfeiture in drug-related
cases not only stem from the nature of civil forfeiture but also from
governmental policy toward drug offenses. 8 In recent decades, the United
States government has tried to take a hard-line stance on narcotics
offenses."9 With the escalating problem of drug use in the United States,2"
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Abuse Prevention and Control Act
("the Act") in 1970, which provided tough enforcement and strict
punishment for drug-related offenses. 2' Although the Act, later codified in
21 U.S.C. Section 881, authorized the forfeiture of contraband and
property used in violation of federal drug laws, it failed to provide law
enforcement agencies with the necessary means to combat the sophisticated
drug trade.22
In response to the failure of the Act to meet expectations, Congress
enacted legislation that would eventually become the government's most
powerful weapon against narcotics trafficking.23 The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 revised Section 881 to include all real property that

17. 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (1998).
18. See President's Radio Address to Nation on Federal Drug Policy (Oct. 2, 1982), in 18
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1249, 1250. In his radio address, President Reagan said: "[W]e've
taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on
drugs." Id.
19. See Lance Gay, Asset ForfeitureSeen as Out of Hand; Suspects Paying For Unproven
Crimes, Critics Contend,THE WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 13, 1999, at A3. Gay, quoting former Assistant
U.S. Attorney General David Smith: "seizing farms, boats[,] and houses was never intended to
subsidize police budgets, and the asset forfeiture laws weren't meant to be used to enforce
drunken-driving laws or to take the belongings of people who aren't charged with crimes." Id.
20. See Zalman, supra note 10, at A 1l.
21. See Pub. L. No. 91-513,84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970)).
Among the amendments provided for by the Act was the adoption of authorized civil forfeiture for
any contraband or property used or acquired in violation of federal narcotics laws. See id.
22. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
23. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3381.
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was used in any manner to facilitate any violation of federal narcotics law.2 4
According to Senate reports, the intent behind the revisions was to punish
and deter by stripping the offenders of their economic power.
Under Section 881, civil forfeiture may be imposed on all illegal
controlled substances, property used as a container for controlled
substances, conveyances used to traffic drugs, assets furnished by or used
in the drug trade, and real property involved in drug violations. 26 The
potency of Section 881 comes from its codification of the civil forfeiture
theory that was used by the government in admiralty cases. 27 Historically,
civil forfeiture was used to seize pirate ships operating in United States
waters.28 In an 1827 case, The Palmyra,the Supreme Court upheld the
forfeiture of an alleged pirate ship even though its crew had been acquitted
of criminal charges. 29 According to Justice Story, the ship was subject to
forfeiture under the "guilty property theory."30 Under this theory, the
offense is attached to the property rather than the owner.3 Establishing the
guilt of the offenders became unnecessary.32 Moreover, because the
proceedings were civil and did not require any criminal adjudication prior
to the forfeiture, the lower burden of persuasion used in civil cases

24. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1992). Section 881 provided for the forfeiture of:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole or any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this sub-chapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
25. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 881(1992).
27. See Paul Dryer, Note, Bennis v. Michigan: GuiltyPropertyNot People is Still The Focus
of Civil Forfeiture Law, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 371, 374 (1997).
28. See id.
29. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
30. See id. at 14. The civil forfeiture theory relied upon by the Court had its origins in
English Common Law. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1993) (summarizing
the history of civil forfeiture). In medieval England, if an object caused the death of a human, it
was subject to a deodand. See id. According to the law of deodand, property involved in the death
of a person would be forfeited to the King who would either use the value of the property to fund
a Mass in recognition of the dead person or give the property to some charity. See id.
31. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14. Justice Story wrote: "The thing is here
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence [sic] is attached primarily to the thing;
and this, whether the offence [sic] be malum prohibitum, or malum in se." Id.
32. See id. at 12.
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applied.33 Recognizing the potential impact civil forfeiture could have on
narcotics cases, Congress incorporated this theory into anti-drug
legislation.34
The impact that the revised Section 881 had on the government's fight
against the drug offenders was astounding. 35 Between its inception in 1985
and 1991, Section 881 resulted in the forfeiture of more than 1.5-billion
dollars in assets.36 From 1992 to 1997, federal agencies almost doubled
that amount. 37 As incredible as these statistics are, they do not reflect the
amount seized through state forfeiture statutes.38
Although Section 881 proved to be valuable in preventing drug dealers'
access to their ill-gotten gain, there was some question as to how much
property should be subject to forfeiture. 39 The problem appeared to cause
the most debate when the value of the property seized was much greater
than the value of the drugs seized from the underlying drug offense.'

33. See id.
34. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
35. See Eaddy, supra note 9, at 715; Molly Ivins, U.S. Citizens Are Victims of Those
Fighting 'War on Drugs,' St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 24, 1998, at B7.
36. See Ivins, supra note 35, at B7.
37. See Zophia Rendon, G.P.D. Help in Arresting Drug Lord Nets Community Almost
$500,000, INDEP. FLA. ALLIGATOR, Oct. 27, 1999 at 4. Even a small college town like Gainesville,
Florida feels the influence of asset forfeiture. See id. As recognition for its part in the capture of an
international drug lord, the Gainesville Police Department received five checks totaling $461,784
from the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida. See id. According to the U.S. District
Attorney, the forfeited assets will be "used to benefit the community." Id.
38. See Gay, supra note 19, at A3 (referring to statements by Rachel King of the American
Civil Liberties Union).
39. See Oversightof FederalAsset Forfeiture:Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing on H.R.
1658 Before the Criminal Justice Oversight Subcommittee, 106th Cong. 1, (1999) [hereinafter
Forfeiture Hearing] (statement of Gilbert Gallegos, National President of the Fraternal Order of
Police). Gallegos states:
The impetus for this hearing is no doubt the recent attempts to reform forfeiture
procedures through enactment of H.R. 1658, which passed the House of
Representatives last month ....
Proponents of the bill attacked law enforcement's
use of civil forfeiture and made several veiled references to police officers serving
as the government's bounty hunters. Several lawmakers came to the floor to
describe the "horror stories" of law enforcement's supposedly unjust attempts to
take property away from innocent citizens.
Id.
40. See Ivins, supra note 35, at B7. Ivins writes, "police forces can get far more money by
busting small-time marijuana buyers in reverse stings (where the cops sell drugs to unsuspecting
customers) and then seizing their assets than they can by, say, going after major methamphetamine
dealers." Id.

2OOO]l

CIVIL FORFEITURE AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

Judicial concern for the possible misuse of Section 881 became apparent
when, in 1992, defendants in two different circuits argued that the Eighth
Amendment barred excessive civil forfeitures.4 ' Even though both cases
involved the seizure of property that was disproportional to the value of the
drugs involved, each circuit held that the forfeitures were constitutional
under the Eighth Amendment.42 While the courts agreed that the seizures
were valid, they differed as to whether civil forfeiture was a form of
punishment.43 When the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit,
holding that the seizures were not a form of punishment and that the
Excessive Fines Clause was inapplicable to civil forfeitures, the stage was
set for the Supreme Court to step in and provide guidance."
B. Austin v. United States
In Austin v. United States,45 a South Dakota court sentenced the
defendant for one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute.' Subsequently, the federal government filed a forfeiture action
under Section 881 in federal district court against Austin's mobile home
and body shop.4 7 The court granted the government's request for summary
judgment based on an officer's affidavit that Austin had brought two grams
of cocaine from his mobile home to the body shop in order to finalize a
sale.48 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reluctantly rejected Austin's argument
that the civil forfeiture of his home and workplace violated the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.49 Disagreeing with the Eighth
Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause did apply

41. See Kristen Michelle Caione, Note, When Does In Rem Civil ForfeitureUnder21 U.S.C.
881(a)(7) Constitute an Excessive Fine?:An Overview and an Attempt to Set Forth a Uniform
Standard,47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1093, 1099-1100 (1997) (referring to United States v. 508 Depot
St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 38 Whaler's Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35
(2d Cir. 1991)).
42. See id. at 1099.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
46. See id. at 604.
47. See id. at 605.
48. See id. at 604-05. Upon the execution of a search warrant, state authorities discovered
small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a .22 caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and
approximately $4,700 in cash. See id.
49. See United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d at 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992). Although the
Eighth Circuit thought that the government was "exacting too high a penalty in relation to the
offense committed," the court felt that its hands were tied from deciding whether the forfeiture
was unconstitutional based on the guilt or innocence of the landowner. Id. "We are constrained
to agree with the Ninth Circuit that '[ijf the [C]onstitution allows in rem forfeiture to be visited
upon innocent owners... the Constitution hardly requires proportionality review of forfeitures."'
Id. (quoting United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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to civil forfeitures.5 ° According to the Court, the answer as to whether the
Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil forfeitures depended on whether the
seizure was a form of punishment. 5'
Traditionally, the Excessive Fines Clause only applied to criminal
forfeitures because the punishment was directly aimed at the defendant. 2
However, with civil forfeiture and the theory of "guilty property," the
defendant was not considered part of the proceedings and was not the
object of the punishment.53 Although the Supreme Court upheld the legal
fiction surrounding civil forfeiture, it recognized that the owner of the
property was the true recipient of the punishment brought on by the
seizure.54 Because the owner was considered to have been punished by the
forfeiture, the Court reasoned that he was entitled to bring an excessive
fines defense.55
Although the Court held that the Eighth Amendment was applicable, it
declined to articulate a test for determining when a forfeiture is excessive.56
Instead, the Court left the task of determining excessiveness up to the lower
courts." As a result, inconsistency arose among the circuits as to what
standard to use.58 One standard used among the circuits was the
proportionality test.59 According to Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin,
the proportionality test considers the callousness of the seizure against the
gravity of the offense. 60 The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the
proportionality analysis and adopted the instrumentality test instead.6 '
Under the instrumentality test, the focus is on the relationship between the

50. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
51. See id. at 607-08. Some provisions of the Bill of Rights are expressly limited to criminal
cases. See id. For example, the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause provides: "No
person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. The text
of the Eighth Amendment contains no similar limitation. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 615 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921)).
54. See id. at 618.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 622.
57. See id.
58. See Caione, supra note 41, at 1103 (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716,
722 (3d Cir. 1995)). "[T]hose jurisdictions applying Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses
in non-capital cases have adopted methods which have not been fully reconciled either within or
among the circuits, making it difficult to predict.. . [w]hat type of analysis will be applied." Id.
59. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. See id. Justice Scalia noted that a consideration of excessiveness should only concern
the property's role in the commission of the underlying offense rather that its value. See id. Scalia
reasoned that "[u]nlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed,
not by determining the appropriate value of the penalty in relation to the committed offense, but
by determining what property has been 'tainted' by unlawful use ..... Id. at 627.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 360-65 (4th Cir. 1994).

CIVIL FORFEITURE AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

20001

211

charged.62

property involved and the offense
With the circuits applying
different standards in the consideration of excessiveness, inconsistencies
naturally occurred throughout the federal courts.63 Eventually, the Supreme
Court revisited the issue and attempted to provide some answers as to what
is considered excessive.'
III. UNITED STA TEs v. BAJAKAJIAN

Although UnitedStates v. Bajakajian" was a criminal forfeiture case
involving customs violations, it gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to
address the growing concern about inconsistent interpretations of
excessiveness in civil forfeitures.6 In Bajakajian,customs officials stopped
the defendant as he attempted to board a plane bound for Cyprus. 67 Aided
by dogs trained to smell for currency, customs officials asked Baj akajian if
he was aware of the federal law that required all persons leaving the United
States to report any money they were carrying in excess of$10,000.68 Even
though officials had already discovered $230,000 in Bajakajian's checked
baggage, he denied carrying more than the $10,000 limit. 69 In total, U.S.
Customs recovered $357,144 from Bajakajian, his wife, and their luggage.70
As a result, Bajakajian was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts,
including failure to report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). 7 Bajakajian
plead guilty to the charge of failure to report and requested a bench trial for
the count upon which the total forfeiture amount was based.7
At trial, the district court determined that the money involved was
lawfully earned and that forfeiture of the entire amount would be extremely
harsh.73 Despite Section 982, 74 which states that the entire unreported
amount was subject to forfeiture because it was involved in the offense, the

62. See id. at 365. The instrumentality test, according to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, considers three factors: (1) The connection between the offense and the extent of the
property's role in the crime; (2) the culpability of the owner; (3) a determination of whether the
offending property can be separated from the remainder. See id.
63. See Caione, supra note 41, at 1103.
64. See United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).

65. See id.
66. See Shiely, supra note 6, at 1597.
67. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 2029, 2032; Section 982(a)(1) provides that anyone convicted of willfully
violating 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A), failure to report currency in excess of $10,000 that is
transported out of the country, shall forfeit any property involved in such an offense. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1) (1996).
72. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2029.
73. See id. at 2029-30.
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(I) (1996).
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trial judge held that such application would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause.75 Instead of allowing the seizure of the entire amount, the court
fined the defendant $5,000 under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
ordered the forfeiture of an additional $15,000 to reflect the seriousness of
the offense.76
On appeal by the government, the Ninth Circuit used a two-prong test
to consider whether the government's original forfeiture claim over the
entire amount was excessive under the Eighth Amendment." According to
the Ninth Circuit, excessiveness was determined by combining the
instrumentality test with the proportionality test.78 In its analysis, the court
noted that the money was not an instrumentality of the crime because the
charge involved a failure to report and not the transportation of the
currency. 9 Because the currency did not meet the instrumentality prong of
the test, the court stated that there was no need to go forward with the
second prong and held that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines
Clause.8"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict as to what
standard applied to an excessive fines analysis.8 ' In a five-to-four decision,
the Supreme Court held that the original forfeiture amount violated the
Excessive Fines Clause. 2 Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of
excessiveness, the majority stated that reviewing the forfeiture under an
instrumentality test was unnecessary because the seizure was punitive. 3
Instead, the Court reasoned that excessiveness in a punitive forfeiture could

75. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2030.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 2032.
82. See id. at 203 1. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court and was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. See id. at 2028. Justice Kennedy penned the
dissent and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. See id. The
interesting aspect of this division among the justices is that Thomas, a noted conservative, sided
with the more liberal justices. See also Frank Murray, Scalia, Thomas Part Ways on Excessive
Fine Decision: Like-Minded Justices Disagree on Customs' Action Toward Traveler, WASH.

TIMEs, June 23, 1998, at A3.
83. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036. According to the Court, an instrumentality analysis
was unnecessary because
[t]he currency in question is not an instrumentality in any event... the currency
is merely the subject of the crime of failure to report. Cash in a suitcase does not
facilitate the commission of that crime as, for example, an automobile facilitates
the transportation of goods concealed to avoid taxes.

Id. at 2036 n.9.
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only be decided from a proportionality determination." The majority then
articulated the first test for determining excessiveness in forfeiture actions
by stating: "a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense." 5
Under the grossly disproportional analysis, the Court's main concern
was determining the gravity of Bajakajian's offense.86 In deciding the
appropriate penalty for failing to report, the majority considered two
issues." First, because judicial determination of the gravity of an offense is
"inherently imprecise," the Court stated that judgments concerning
appropriate punishment were for the legislature to decide. 8 Second, the
majority noted that specific factors relative to the individual defendant
should also be considered.89 In applying the first part of this rationale, the
Court looked to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the maximum fine
allowed for the crime of failing to report.90 According to the Court, the
$5,000 maximum fine was a quantitative measure of the gravity of failing
to report.9 Because the $5,000 maximum fine indicated only a minimal
level of culpability, the Court stated that the amount sought was greater
than the amount imposed by the federal guidelines "by many orders of
magnitude."92

84. See id. at 2036.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 2037-38.
87. See id. According to Justice Thomas, reviewing a proportionality determination requires
comparing the amount of forfeiture to the gravity of the offense. See id. In order to determine the
gravity of the offense, the majority stated that the amount subject to forfeiture should be compared
to the maximum fines imposed by sentencing guidelines. See id. However, in the case at bar,
Justice Thomas also took into consideration individual factors concerning the defendant. See id
at 2038.
[A]s the District Court found, respondent's violation was unrelated to any other
illegal activities [and] ... was to be used to repay a lawful debt. Whatever his
other vices, respondent does not fit into the class of persons for whom the statute
was principally designed: He is not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax
evader.
Id.
88. Id. at 2037 (referring to the reasoning in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)).
89. See id. at 2038.
90. See id. The maximum fine for willfully violating the statutory reporting requirement is
$250,000. See id. at 2038-39 n.14. Because the maximum fine to which Bajakajian was subject
to was only a fraction of the penalty authorized by the guidelines, the Court reasoned that the
defendant's culpability was minimal when compared to other potential violators (i.e., tax evaders
and drug kingpins). See id. at 2038.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 2039.
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In its consideration of the specific factors of the case, the Court noted
that the harm caused by the defendant was minimal.93 Justice Thomas stated
that "[h]ad his crime gone undetected, the Government would have been
deprived only of the information that $357,144 had left the country. 9 4
Relying on the district court's findings, the majority stated that the
respondent did not fit the mold of a money launderer or drug trafficker.95
Because Bajakajian's actions posed little threat to the government, the
Court held that the forfeiture of the entire $357,144 was grossly
disproportional to the offense.96
IV. POST-BAJAKAJIAN INTERPRETATION

A. United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive
Since the Supreme Court's adoption of an excessiveness standard in
Bajakajian,property owners in drug-related cases have tried to apply the
gross disproportionality test to their own forfeiture defenses.97 For example,
in October of 1991, Charles Howerin was arrested for selling cocaine out
of his home.9 After Howerin was convicted in a Florida court on drug
possession and trafficking charges, the United States brought a forfeiture
action against his property pursuant to Section 881.99

93. See id.
94. Id. at 2039. The majority took exception with the dissents characterization of Bajakajian
as a smuggler. See id. at 2038 n.13 (referring to the dissent written by Justice Kennedy).
According to the majority, there was no evidence that the defendant violated any law other than
failing to report. See id. The dissent's consideration of the individual characteristics surrounding
the defendant were quite different. See id. at 2045 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Under the dissent's
interpretation, the lies Bajakajian told along with the suspicious circumstances (the unreported
money was hidden in the false bottom of one of Bajakajian's suitcases) suggests that his
culpability was much greater than the majority assumed. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. See id.
at 2038.
96. See id.at 2039.
97. See United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. The Premises & Real Property Located at 162-A, Civ. No. 1998-0082, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8916 at *I(D.C. V.I. June 9, 1999).
98. See 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d at 1307.
99. See id. In response to the government's claim, Howerin filed a claim of ownership with
the court and then answered the Government's complaint. See id. Among Howerin's defenses to
the forfeiture were: (I) The property consisted of two parcels of land ("Lot 1" and "Lot 56") and
only Lot 56 was used for the criminal activity, therefore, only that parcel is subject to forfeiture;
(2) the forfeiture of the property valued at nearly $70,000 for drugs worth $3,250 constituted an
excessive fine; (3) the seizure of his property after having been tried on the underlying drug
charges constituted double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id.
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According to Howerin, the property the government wished to seize
actually consisted of two parcels of land, of which only one was used for
criminal activity.' 00 Moreover, Howerin contended that the forfeiture of
both parcels of land (valued at $70,000) for drug sales totaling $3,250 was
an excessive fine.'0 ' At trial, the district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment as to the lot on which the sales were made
but held that the government had not shown a substantial connection
between the other lot and the criminal activity.0 2
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of whether the
government's seizure was an excessive fine by acknowledging that the
"grossly disproportionate" rule in Bajakajian controlled the issue. 0 3
Following the Supreme Court's reference to legislative deference in
Bajakajian,the Eleventh Circuit stated that translating the gravity of the
crime into monetary terms could be solved by referring to the opinions of
both Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission."° In
analyzing Congress' interpretation of maximum permissible fines, the court
noted that its legislative pronouncements regarding the appropriate range
of fines represented "the collective opinion of the American people as to
what is and is not excessive."' 0 5
Because of the deference afforded to congressional decisions, the court
stated that if the value of property was within the proscribed range, there
was a strong presumption that the forfeiture was constitutional.'" The
court then noted that the United States Sentencing Commission
promulgated sentencing guidelines that were "the product of extensive
research, thought, input from commentators, and experience.' ' °7 Because
the commission was designed to proportion punishments with greater
precision than criminal legislation, the Eleventh Circuit held that
a defendant would need to present a very compelling
argument to persuade us to substitute our judgment for that of
the United States Sentencing Commission. Thus, in a
forfeiture action, if the value of the property forfeited is within
or near the permissible range of fines under the sentencing
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1309.
102. See id. at 1307.
103. See id. at 1309.
104. See id.Although the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on congressionally proscribed fines fits
within the reasoning of Bajakajian, its reference to the United States Sentencing Commission was
novel. See id. Unlike the Supreme Court, which stated that judgments concerning the appropriate
punishment for an offense belong to the legislature, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a "judicial
agency" to interpret permissible fines. Id.
105. Id. at 1309.
106. See id. (referring to the Bajakajian Court's deference to legislative decisions).
107. Id. at 1310.
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Missing from the Eleventh Circuit's analysis under Bajakajianwas a
consideration of factors specific to the individual defendant.' 0 9 Among
Howerin's defenses was the contention that the forfeiture of his personal
residence would impose a special hardship on him." 0 While the court
acknowledged that characteristics of the offender are an important part in
the trial court's determination of an appropriate fine,"' it refused to
112
consider any potential hardships under an excessive fines inquiry.
According to the court's interpretation of Bajakajian, "excessiveness is
determined in relation to the characteristics of the offense, not in relation
to the characteristics of the offender." ' 13 Thus, Howerin's argument that his
actions posed only a minimal threat in relation to the size of the forfeiture
was unpersuasive." 4 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit rested its decision
solely on whether the value of the seized property was grossly
disproportional to the permissible range of fines. 15 Because the maximum
statutory fine for Howerin's four cocaine sales was over one-million
dollars, the Eleventh Circuit held that the forfeiture of a $70,000 piece of
property did not violate the Eighth Amendment." 6
B. United States v. The Premises
& Real Property Located at 162-A
In United States v. The Premises & Real Property Located at No.
162-A,' 17 the defendant, Olivia Finley, rented the bottom floor of her house
to two men that were allegedly engaged in the cultivation of marijuana
plants.1 8 After police obtained a warrant and found numerous plants

108. Id.
109. See id. at 1311.
110. See id. Part of Howerin's contention that the forfeiture of his home would be an excessive
fine was based on the fact that he had a permanent disability. See id. Because of his permanent
disability, Howerin argued that he was prevented from obtaining employment and, therefore, had
no other means of purchasing another residence. See id.
111. See id. (citing to 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1994) which authorizes remission of forfeiture
amounts when there are mitigating circumstances, such as hardship to the owner).
112. See id. at 1311 n. 12 (stating "[s]uch hardship merely is not part of an inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause").
113. Id. at 1311 (noting, "The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that whether a
forfeiture is 'excessive' is determined by comparing the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of
the offense, see Bajakajian.... 118 S.Ct. at 2036, and not by comparing the amount of the
forfeiture to the amount of the owner's assets.").
114. See id.

115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 1310.
See id.
Civ. No. 1998-0082, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916 at *1-2 (D.C. V.I. June 9, 1999).
See id. According to the trial court, in June of 1997, law enforcement officers assigned
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throughout the property, Finley and the two men were arrested. 1 9 Charges
against Finley were eventually dropped because of her lack of knowledge
about the illegal activities.1 20 Even though she was cleared of having any
participation in the matter, the United States conducted forfeiture
proceedings pursuant to Section 881.121 In response, Finley contended that:
(1) the forfeiture of her $150,000 house was grossly disproportionate to the
$30,000 maximum fine imposed on the defendant Huggins and (2) the
gravity of the offense mandated a fine worth substantially less than her
house. 122
In its analysis of the first argument, the District Court for the District
of the Virgin Islands stated that Finley could not point to the fine imposed
on her tenants as evidence of disproportionality 1 23 The court noted that the
$30,000 maximum fine imposed on the co-defendant Huggins did not
apply to Finley. 24 Because she never admitted guilt for any portion of the
crimes, the court held that Finley was subject
to the full penalty for all of
1 25
the marijuana plants found on her property.
Under the federal statutes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
maximum fine that could have been attributed to Finley was $2,000,000. 126
Because the value of Finley's house fell well below the maximum fine, the
forfeiture was not excessive under the grossly disproportional test.127
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in 817 N.E. 29th Drive,
the district court in The Premises & Real PropertyLocated at No. 162-A
took into consideration the individual characteristics of the property

to St Croix's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program found marijuana seedlings
around the property. See id. The officers warned Finely about the discovery and then destroyed the
plants. See id. After the warning, HIDTA officers continued surveillance on the property until the
discovery of the 260 marijuana plants that were the subject the current forfeiture. See id.
119. Seeid.
120. See id.

121. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7).
122. Finely's gravity argument was based on the fact that the charges against her were
dropped and she was not involved in any other illegal activities. See The Premises &Real Property
Locatedat No. 162-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5. Therefore, the government suffered no actual
loss as a result of her actions. See id.
123. See id. at *7.

124. See id. The $30,000 fine referred to by Finely was the maximum fine that was attributable
to Huggins as the result of a plea agreement. See id. As part of his agreement to plead guilty to
possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute, Huggins admitted to possessing 20 marijuana
plants (out of the 260 found) which carried an imprisonment range of 10-16 months and a fine
between $3,000-$30,000. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at *6-7 (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and U.S.S.G. § 5 El.2).
127. See id. at *7. The district court also relied on the individual factors of Finely's situation
in its justification of the forfeiture amount: "a forfeiture of her house worth $155,000 does not

appear excessive, especially since officers found over 200 plants being cultivated on Finely's
property on two different occasions." Id.
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owner."' In considering whether the gravity of the offense was worth
substantially less than the forfeited property, the court held that the
government was not directly harmed by her actions. 129 However, the court
noted that Finley's failure to act after being warned facilitated "drug
production and use [which] exacts a heavy toll from government and
society in the form of crime, addiction, and their concomitant ills."' 3 ° Thus,
the district court held that the repercussions of the claimant's actions
justified the forfeiture of the house."'
V. ANALYZING POST-BAJAKAJIAN DECISIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Bajakajian marked the first time a
forfeiture had ever -been struck down as excessive under the Eighth
Amendment.' Since the Court's decision in the summer of 1998, federal
courts have heard at least seven claims based on objections to forfeiture
penalties under Section 881.133 In each case, the property owner has tried
to use the excessive fines test under Bajakajian. 34 Although each court
agreed that Bajakajian35 applied to Section 881 forfeitures, every seizure
was upheld under the grossly disproportional analysis. 36 Whether the
Excessive Fines Clause will ever be used to strike down a Section 881
forfeiture remains to be seen. If the decisions in 817 N.E. 29th Drive and
The Premises& Real PropertyLocated at No. 162-A are any indication of
future decisions, the outcome looks grim for minor drug offenders.'
One reason why the courts in 817 N.E. 29th Drive and The Premises&
Real Property Located at No. 162-A did not hold the Section 881
forfeitures as excessive was because of the judicial reliance on Draconian

128. See id.
at $1-2, *7-8.
129. See id.
at *8.

130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See Bajakajian, 118 S.Ct. at 2033.
133. See United States v. 219 Ingersol St., Civ. No. 99-6115 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23704,
at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 1999); 47 West 644 Route 38, Maple Park, Civ. No. 97-4145 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19655, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 1999); United States v. Asquini, Civ. No. 98-10293
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088, at *6 (9th Cir. May 12, 1999); Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.
3d 619, 624 (1999); United States v. 40 Clark Road, 52 F. Supp. 2d 254, 266 (D. Mass. 1999)

(1999).
134. See 2191ngersol St., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *3; 47 West Route 38, Maple Park, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS, at *4; Asquini, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *9-10; Towers, 173 F.3d at 624; 40
Clark Road, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 266.

135. See Bajakajian, 118 S.Ct. at 2028.
136. See 219 IngersolSt.,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *3; 47 West 644 Route 38, Maple Park,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *6; Asquini, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, at * 11; Towers, 173 F.3d at 626;

40 Clark Road, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
137. See 817 N.E.29th Drive, 175 F. 3d at 1309-12; The Premises & Real PropertyLocated
at No. 162-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916, at *4-8 (D.C. V.I. June 9, 1999).
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sentencing guidelines.' According to the Supreme Court in Bajakajian,
the judiciary must look to the legislature for a determination of what is
considered the permissible range of fines. 3 9 Because the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and federal statutes impose heavy fines on drug related offenses,
both courts had no choice but to find the forfeitures within the permissible
range. 140 The reason for these extraordinary fines is that such penalties are
necessary to make Section 881 forfeitures effective. 4'

,Without

the

government imposing high fines on narcotic offenders, the sophisticated
dealer only would
have to pay a minimal amount when compared to the
42
profits taken in. 1

Although these fines are justified for the sophisticated dealer, they
appear quite unfair to the average drug peddler who uses the profits to pay
for his own addiction or to supplement his income. 143 As in 817 N.E. 29th
Drive, a small time dealer who purchases his house through honest means
may end up losing itjust because the individual unwisely decides to use his
house to sell a miniscule amount of narcotics. 44 Because the federal
statutes and guidelines provide severe fines for drug offenses, the small45time
dealer risks losing the same amount of property as the drug baron.

138. See Matthew Campese & Patrick Dussol, Note, Discretion: The Better Part of Valor in
the War on Drugs, 9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 725, 727 (1994). Campese and Dussol note:
While the Guidelines reflect a new perspective towards the "war on drugs," they
remain consistent with the Nation's earlier approaches to criminal justice.
Historically, the United States emphasized capital punishment as a means of
deterrence .... In the late 1970's, rehabilitation was denounced as ineffective
because it created a "revolving door" whereby offenders were deemed reformed
and released only to commit new crimes.
Id.
139. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037.
140. See Campese & Dussol, supra note 138, at 737-38.
The drug epidemic has a profound effect on the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Constitution. After Hamerlin [111 S. Ct. 2680 (199 1)], it appears that no
member of the Court will interfere in the 'offense grading' of noncapital
punishment for violent crimes. Furthermore, the majority of the Court will
uphold any period of incarceration, including life sentence without parole, for all
drug trafficking convictions or simple possession cases ....
Id.
141. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1984).
142. See id.
143. See Hiaasen, supra note 7, at 3 (quoting Stephen Melnick, a former prosecutor of
forfeiture cases for the Boca Raton Police Department) ("[the statute had some good intentions
to punish the big-time trafficker, [b]ut the only one getting punished is the small-time user").
144. See 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d at 1309-11.
145. See Campese & Dussol, supranote 138, at 737-38.
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Another reason why the excessive fines defense may fail, despite the
ruling in Bajakajian, is the failure by the courts to consider individual
characteristics as mitigating factors.' 46 InBajakajian,the majority took into
account the factors surrounding the defendant's commission of the crime. 47
According to Justice Thomas, Bajakajian's only crime was failing to inform
the government that $357,144 was leaving the country.'48 Because of the
district court's finding that Bajakajian was not a money launderer or drug
trafficker, the majority was able to conclude that he posed no threat to the
government. 49 The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in 817 N.E. 29th Drive is an
excellent example of the judiciary's reluctance to be lenient to minor drug
offenders. 50
Unfortunately for the property owner in 817 N.E. 29th Drive, the
Supreme Court's consideration of individual factors was just dicta.'5 ' The
Supreme Court noted Bajakajian's specific circumstances in order to
emphasize the disparity between the crime and the amount seized. 5 ' As
such, the Eleventh Circuit was not obligated to consider the specific
characteristics of the property owner.5 3 In 817 N.E. 29th Drive, the
property owner argued that forfeiture of his residence would create a
special hardship because he lacked other assets and was permanently
disabled.5 4 Even though the Eleventh Circuit could have followed the
Supreme Court's approach by considering the individual characteristics, it
declined to do so.' The reason the court did not take into account the
mitigating factors of the landowner was because ofthe public policy against
drug offenders. 5 6 Concern for drug offenders and any special circumstances

Furthermore, the majority of the [Supreme] Court will uphold any period of
incarceration, including life without parole, for all drtig trafficking convictions
or simple possession cases, provided the defendant possessed a substantial
amount. Unfortunately, this approach places all offenders in the same category,
and ignores drug couriers or marginally involved offenders.... The defendant's
role has only minimal impact on the eventual sentence length.
Id.
146. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2038.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 2039.
149. See id.
150. See United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d. 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 1999).
151. See id.
152. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2039.
153. See United States v. Roeming, 52 F. Supp. 857,861 (N.D. Iowa 1943). "The considered
dicta of a court of last resort are entitled to the respectful recognition of inferior courts within the
same judicial system." Id.
154. See 817N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d at 1311.
155. See id.
156. See Richard L. Berke, Crime Replaces Economy as Top Concern in Poll, GAINESVILLE
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they may claim would frustrate the "zero tolerance" public policy.'5 7 While
a court may consider mitigating factors in a customs violation, there is little
chance it would show sympathy for drug offenders.' 58
Even if a court decides to follow the dicta of the Supreme Court and
take individual characteristics of the property owner into consideration, 59
60
it is unlikely that drug offenders will receive helpful consideration.
Although the Supreme Court's reference to specific factors of the offender
is persuasive, such characteristics are often harmful to the property
owner.'16 In contrast to other crimes, drug-related offenses are typically62
viewed by the public as the most damaging to the fabric of society.
Because of strong public policy against drugs, even offenders with low
culpability will not obtain sympathetic treatment by the courts. 63 The
district court's decision in The Premises & Real PropertyLocated at No.
162-A illustrates this attitude.'64
In The Premises & Real PropertyLocated at No. 162-A, the district
court found that the property owner was not involved in the marijuana
cultivation activity on her land.' 6' Despite her lack of participation, the
court stated that the failure to take any action after being warned justified
the forfeiture. 66 According to the court, even the slightest involvement in
drug- related activity "exacts a heavy toll from government and society.' 67

SuN, Jan. 23, 1994, at 2A; see also 817N.E.29th Drive, 175 F.3d at 1311 n.12.
157. See Campese & Dussol, supra note 138, at 734-35.
158. See id. at 738-39. Campese and Dussol note that judicial discretion is not completely
eliminated under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 739. Judges may depart from the
required sentence under certain circumstances. See id.
159. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2038.
160. See Phillip J.Lavelle, Local US. Judge Resigns; Cites Sentencing Guidelines, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 27, 1990, at A-I.
161. See The Premises & Real PropertyLocated at No. 162-A, Civ. No. 1998-0082, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916, at *8.
162. See Margaret P. Spencer, Symposium: The Sentencing Controversy: Punishmentand
Policy in the War Against Drugs: Sentencing Drug Offenders: The IncarcerationAddiction, 40
VILL. L. REv. 335, 337-38 (1995).
163. See Lavelle, supra note 160. The judicial attitude towards drug related offenders has its
dissention. See id.Some judges have come forth and criticized the sentencing guidelines for their
harsh treatment of defendants; especially drug offenders. See id.
164. See The Premises & Real PropertyLocated atNo. 162-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916,
at *8.
165. See id. at *5.
166. See id. at *8.
167. Id.
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VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE CIVIL FORFEITURE DILEMMA

The likelihood that Congress will amend federal sentencing guidelines
or statutes for drug-related offenses is remote. 161 One reason why the
federal government will never ease its stance on drug-related sentencing is
the impression such action would have on voters. 69 Fighting the 'War on
Drugs' has been a popular platform for many politicians seeking support
from disgruntled citizens. 7 By moderating the penalties for drug-related
offenses, the government would give the impression that narcotics
trafficking was no longer an important issue for the country. 7 ' Any
support such a reform could be seen as out of touch
politician that would1 72
with voter concerns.
Another reason why Congress may be unwilling to temper sentencing
guidelines is the impact such action would have on the funding of law
enforcement agencies. 73 Reducing the amount of fines for drug offenses
would result in less property subjected to forfeiture.' 74 This would mean
that Congress would have to look elsewhere for funding of federal
agencies.175 With the government's dependence on the proceeds of
forfeitures to fight the seemingly impossible 'War on Drugs,' there is little
chance that reform will be forthcoming.
Because legislative reform of federal sentencing guidelines or statutes
does not appear likely, solutions to civil forfeiture's disparate effect on
minor drug offenders must be found elsewhere. 76 One possibility for
77
change is the proposed Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"). 1
CAFRA is intended by its sponsors to level the playing field in civil
forfeiture cases by eliminating "opportunities for abuse created by the
combination of procedures which impose only minimal burdens on the
168. See Campese & Dussol, supra note 138, at 728-29. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
have survived attacks based on the issues of delegation and the separation of powers, due process,
and the Eighth Amendment. See id.
169. See Anthony Flint, Voters 'FearofViolence Takes Hold in SenateRace, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 24, 1994, at 1.
170. See Ivins, supranote 35, at B7. Ivins writes: "Envision the ads in re-election campaigns:
'My opponent sided with the drug dealers and against the police officers of our fair states."' Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Forfeiture Hearing, supra note 39, at I. Gallegos states: "It provides State and local
police agencies with much needed resources that can be used to provide officer safety equipment
or to supplement the funds available to fight crime." Id.
174. See id.
175. See Fueyo, supra note 5, at 144. Fueyo writes, "These proceeds have enabled state and
federal legislators to benefit from better funded law enforcement departments without reallocating
tax dollars." Id.
176. See id. at 185-87.
177. See Elkan Abramowitz, The Civil ForfeitureReform Act, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at 3.
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government, and the enormous financial incentives for law enforcement
inherent in a system which plows forfeiture assets back into the very
programs and agencies conducting forfeiture operations."' 78
If the bill is signed into law, new procedural advantages will provide
property owners with a defense to government claims.'79 Among the
procedures proposed by the bill is the return of property during the
forfeiture proceedings.' Currently, a property owner challenging a civil
forfeiture has no access to the property despite any hardships that may
accompany the forfeiture.' This period of deprivation can cause
irreparable harm to a claimant who has successfully defended a forfeiture. 82
Under CAFRA, if the property owner can show that substantial hardship
would result if the property remained with the government until final
disposition, courts can release the property to the owner.8 3
Another reform CAFRA would have on civil forfeiture is the
heightening of the government's burden of proof.'84 Under current
forfeiture procedure, the government only has to show probable cause for
the seizure. 8 ' Once probable cause is established, the burden shifts to the
property owner, who has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
forfeiture of the asset is unjustifiable.' 86 Under CAFRA, the burden of proof
placed on the government would be raised to the clear and convincing
standard.8 7 The heightened standard of proof would prevent the
government from seizing property based on "the rankest of hearsay and the
flimsiest of evidence.' 88
VII. CONCLUSION

On June 23, 1998, newspapers around the country proclaimed that a
new era in civil forfeiture had arrived. With the Supreme Court's decision
in Bajakajian,it was unclear whether the excessive fines defense would
severely restrict governmental forfeiture in drug-related cases. However,
predictions of civil forfeiture's demise have fallen on deaf ears in the court
system. If anything, Bajakajianhas prevented drug offenders from using

178. Id.
179. See Cassandra Burrell, House Passes Bill to Restrain Seizure of Property by Police,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 1999, at A21. The CFRA bill passed in the House by a vote of 375 48. See id.
180. See Abramowitz, supra note 177, at 7.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 9-10.
185. See Feuyo, supra note 5, at 150-51.
186. See Abramowitz, supra note 177, at 9-10.
187. See id.
188. Id. (quoting H.R. REP No. 106-192 (1999)).
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the excessive fines defense. Regardless of the route taken, civil forfeiture
reform must be addressed. The concern for society's welfare that fueled the
government's 'War on Drugs' has spun out of control. Government
forfeitures have become so excessive that the rights of unintended property
owners are being violated. In effect, the public policy that gave birth to civil
forfeiture's dominance has created a counter public policy that demands
providing protection for those left in its wake.

